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Long-Term Contracts and the Principal Agent Problem
Elizabeth Purcell
Abstract
This paper examines the principal-agent problem within professional
sports. Imperfect information between managers and players, as well as the
guaranteed income a long-term contract provides, are predicted to provide players
with the incentive to alter effort over the length of a contract – especially during
the first year of a long-term contract. Regression analysis indicates that players’
performance levels decline during the first year of a long-term contract, suggesting
that the effects of the principal-agent problem may outweigh competing effects.
The study does not, however, suggest that players increase performance in the
final year of a contract.
1. Introduction
The benefits of long-term contracts to firms have been under debate for
some time. On the one hand, employees may focus better on their work if they
are not concerned about losing their jobs. On the other hand, a long-term contract
guarantees income for a certain time period, regardless of the effort put forth.
As employers are not able to monitor every action employees make, employees
are able to reduce effort once a long-term contract is signed. This opportunistic
behavior is most likely to occur when employers are unable to distinguish between
shirking, or not trying, and poor performance due to the stochastic nature of the
environment.
Behavior patterns arising from long-term contracts exemplify the
principal-agent problem. The principal-agent relationship exists when a principal
(the employer) needs to hire an agent (the employee) with specialized skills to
perform a task. The principal must motivate the agent to perform like the principal
would prefer, while facing difficulties in monitoring the agent’s every action
(Sappington 1991). The principal-agent problem occurs when principals and
agents have conflicting goals.
The principal-agent relationship can be seen in various situations in the
real world. In academia, for example, professors are expected to teach classes and
conduct research that will eventually be published. However, once professors have
tenure, they may care less about teaching or may start publishing fewer papers.
With internships, there is an incentive to work hard and perform well because
there is the opportunity for a full-time offer at the end of the internship. However,
once a full-time job has been obtained, there is less urgency for the former-interns
to impress their superiors, as there is no immediate room for advancement.
The motivation behind this study is to examine the principal-agent
problem in the realm of professional sports. Sports is used as a venue for this
study because it is an industry in which labor productivity is easily quantifiable
and the data is openly reported. The existence of imperfect information between
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managers and players, along with the guaranteed income a multi-year contract
provides, may lead players to alter effort over the term of their contracts. In the
contract year, the last year of players’ contracts, players may exert more effort,
hoping to receive long-term contracts with higher salaries the next year. Once
they have signed long-term contracts, however, players may reduce effort, as
they have guaranteed income for the remainder of their contracts, regardless of
performance.
Whereas previous studies have examined long-term contracts in a
specific sport, this paper looks to examine the impact of long-term contracts across
Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National
Hockey League (NHL), and the National Basketball Association (NBA). The
paper proceeds as follows: the next section analyzes the principal-agent problem
and the incentive to shirk given the structure of contracts in the various sports, the
third section provides a literature review, the fourth section describes the data, the
fifth section provides the methodology behind the study, the sixth section presents
and analyzes the results, and the final section draws conclusions and implications
from the study.
2. The Principal-Agent Problem and Collective Bargaining Agreements
Employers are willing to offer secured income contracts because they can
act as incentive mechanisms that motivate employees to put forth as much effort
as they can so they can obtain the contract. Long-term contracts can be beneficial
for both employers and employees. Employers benefit from being able to secure
productive employees and prevent them from moving to the competition (Maxcy
1997), while employees, once they obtain a long-term contract, are promised a
salary for a specific period of time.
Principal-agent theory suggests that when parties of a contract have
different objectives, shirking can occur. When compensation or job security is
dependent on performance, workers are likely to exert as much effort as they can.
However, when compensation is no longer dependent on performance, workers
have less incentive to put forth the same amount of effort. Once agents have
secured income through a contract, effort put into work lowers utility.
Shirking will not necessarily occur, however, because workers may gain
utility from contributing to the success of the firm. For example, professional
athletes derive utility in helping their team win a championship (Maxcy 1997).
Athletes are unlikely to see shirking as beneficial from this standpoint because
if they are not performing at their best, they will contribute to the team losing.
On the other hand, there is less need for workers to be concerned about employer
perceptions of them and their productivity once a long-term contract is signed
(Stiroh 2007). Therefore, there may be less incentive to exert effort once a contract
is signed.
Monitoring shirking is sometimes difficult because individual contribution
is not always easily identified. The free-rider problem can exist, as the team can
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still perform well if one player is not exerting all his effort (Prendergast 1999). If
players can enjoy wins without putting forth all their effort, there is incentive for
them to shirk.
Shirking can occur during games and in other ways as well. Once a longterm contract is obtained, athletes may not train as diligently during the off-season.
Players that are at the end of their contracts want to show that they are willing
work hard to improve their skills and do their best for the team. If players know
they have another five years left on the contract, however, they may spend the offseason relaxing rather than training every day. In addition, whereas athletes who
are at the end of a contract may be more likely to play with an injury in an attempt
to show they are still valuable to the team, athletes who still have time left on their
contracts may avoid playing while injured to avoid the risk of further injury and
shortening their careers.
In order to examine the impact long-term contracts have on performance,
performance needs to be considered at various stages over the length of a contract.
Ideally, effort would be used as the measure of whether players shirk once they
have a secured a long-term contract; however, changes in effort are difficult to
observe. Therefore, performance will be used as the dependent variable, assuming
that if players put forth more effort they will perform better.
The year directly preceding contract negotiation is when players are
likely to put forth the most effort. While there is more information in players’
performance history as a whole, salaries are based more on the most recent year of
performance rather than past performance. Healy finds that teams put about twice
as much weight on performance from the past season than on performance from
two or three years ago (Healy 2008). This suggests that shirking is more likely to
occur early in the contract and diminish as players get closer to the contract year.
While principal-agent theory suggests that players have the incentive
to shirk, there are other factors that may impact players’ behavior. Players are
paid not only by salary, but also by endorsements. Players receive endorsements
because they are large contributors to their teams’ success and are popular with
fans. Therefore, endorsements are a disincentive for players to shirk because if
their performance starts declining, they risk losing their endorsements as well
as popularity. As some endorsements rival players’ salaries, the cost of losing
the additional income may be greater than the benefit received from lowering
effort. In addition, if players enjoy having fame, the disutility they may face from
losing fans due to a drop in performance may outweigh the utility players get
from shirking. Many athletes want to leave behind a legacy and be remembered
for being great. Shirking has the potential to taint this legacy, which may prevent
some athletes from shirking. Therefore, endorsement incentive effects, as well as
utility derived from popularity, may offset the shirking that is predicted by the
principal-agent problem.
The principal-agent problem predicts that long-term contracts can create
inefficient pay and performance, unless mechanisms exist within the contract to
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prevent these (Maxcy et al. 2002). When implementing mechanisms in contracts,
incentives should be used carefully. Certain mechanisms, such as tying rewards to
performance, can lead to dysfunctional responses, where agents focus solely on the
specific performance measures listed in the contract (Prendergast 1999). This can
end up damaging firm performance overall, as agents begin to ignore other aspects
of their jobs that do not bring rewards. For example, Ken O’Brian, a quarterback,
was given a contract in which he was penalized any time he threw the ball to the
opposing team. While he threw fewer interceptions, his solution was to hold the
ball rather than throw, instead of working to improve his accuracy (Prendergast
1999). This in the long run hurt the team because its quarterback would not throw
the ball, even in cases when he should have. When used improperly, contract
incentives may be more detrimental than beneficial.
Contracts and other labor issues in professional sports are governed
by collective bargaining agreements (CBA). The CBA, which determines many
parameters that teams and players face when negotiating contracts, is agreed
upon between the league and the league’s respective player’s union. As this study
focuses on the impact of long-term contracts, only the key factors relating to
the contracting framework of each sport will be discussed. The information is
summarized in Table 1. This study focuses on the regular season; therefore, postseason incentives and regulations are not addressed.
Minimum salary levels are a commonality across the four CBAs
examined, however the minimum salary implemented varies between sports. The
existence of a minimum salary predicts that players will be more likely to reduce
effort in the first year of a long-term contract because they know they will at least
get a certain level of income even if they shirk.
The ways in which salary maxima are handled in the different sports show
more variation than salary minima. In MLB, for example, there is no maximum
mandated by the CBA. However, there are limits on how much players’ salaries
can be reduced (MLB CBA 2007), which provides players with the incentive to
shirk after signing a long-term contract because even if performance declines,
their salary can only be reduced by a certain amount. In a sense this is a security
blanket because players are guaranteed a certain salary level in a new contract,
which in many cases is probably higher than the minimum salary requirement. As
such, it is less likely that MLB players will increase effort in the final year of a
contract compared to other
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Only post-season incentives

Performance-based pool

MLB

NFL

Structured to provide incentive for positive achievement, pre-agreed benchmarks

Only for entry level players,
35+ players with 1 year contracts, “400+ game players”
and in last year spent 100+
days on injured reserve and
have 1 year contract in upcoming year (incentives
vary between positions)

NBA

NHL

Pro Bowl

Performance Incentives

Organization
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Entry level compensation: $850,000
(2005) to $925,000 (2011)

Can’t be in excess of 20% of upper limit
for any league year

> 10 yrs. Experience: > 35% salary cap,
105% salary of final season of prior
contract, or $14 million

≥ 7 and < 10 yrs. Experience: > 30% salary cap, 105% salary of final season of
prior contract, or $11 million

< 7 yrs. Experience: > 25% salary cap,
105% salary of final season of prior
contract, or $9 million

None. Salary cap goes into effect if
player costs are more than 56.074% of
total revenue (salary cap is $102 million
in 2006 to 58% of total revenue/number
of teams in 2011)

None. Can’t reduce player’s salary by
more than 20% previous year’s salary
or more than 30% of 2 years previous
salary

Maximum Salary

$450,000 (2008) $525,000 (2011)

$301,875 (1st year
player) - $1,000,000
(more than 9 years
experience)

10+ credited seasons:
$810,000
(2006) to $890,000
(2012)

0 credited seasons:
$275,000 (2006) to
$355,000 (2012)

$380,000 (2007) to
$400,000 + cost of
living adjustment
(2011)

Minimum Salary

Players who have at least 7 years of service or are 27 years
old can declare himself an unrestricted free agent if his contract has expired.
Players who are not entry level but do not qualify for unrestricted free agency can declare themselves a restricted free
agent. Current team must extend qualifying offer to retain
negotiating rights to player, if qualifying offer not made
player becomes unrestricted free agent.
Unrestricted free agent can sign with any team

Players become restricted free agent after 3 years of service
if fourth year option not carried out or after 4 years if team
offers fourth year option.
Unrestricted free agents can sign with any team, restricted
free agents can sign with any team but former team is able to
match contract and keep the player.

Players with four or more years of service whose contract has
expired are qualified for unrestricted free agency and are free
to sign with any team.
Players with three seasons of service whose contract has expired are eligible for restricted free agency. The former team
has the right to match any offer made by another team until
April 21 and retain the player.
Players with 0-2 years of service whose contracts have expired are considered exclusive-rights free agents. If tendered,
they must sign with former team.

Players with 6 or more years of service and have not signed
a contract for the next season are eligible.
As a free agent, can sign with any team.
Must file within 15 days of end of World Series, former club
retains exclusive negotiating rights during those 15 days.

Free Agency

Table 1: CBA Summary (Source: CBAs)

leagues. Similarly, the NFL places no limit on maximum salary unless the salary
cap goes into effect (NFL CBA 2006).
Salary maxima in the NHL and NBA depend on player experience (NHL CBA
2005 and NBA CBA 2005). The differences in maximum salary levels that exist
between players of varying experience levels in the NBA and NHL may provide
incentive for players not to shirk as they approach the next experience bracket.
In the NHL for example, if players are nearing the end of their entry level status,
they may avoid shirking in hopes of boosting their salary in the next contract,
which has the potential to increase more than it was able to as an entry level
contract. However, overall, the existence of a salary maximum in the NHL and
NBA diminishes the likelihood of players increasing effort during the contract
year compared with MLB or the NFL because once players reach the maximum
salary, there is no incentive to continue putting in increasing effort because they
will not be rewarded with a higher salary if performance improves.
The four leagues vary in how they handle performance incentives. While
individual contracts may have performance incentives, these contracts are not
made public, and therefore it is not possible to analyze these differences. However,
the CBAs of the different sports have varying league-wide performance incentive
mechanisms that can be examined. The MLB CBA mentions post-season incentives
for players, but these are not relevant to this study. However, as the reward for
MLB players depends on the performance of the team as a whole and whether
the team makes it into the post-season, the lack of performance incentives in the
regular season potentially provides the incentive to shirk, as there are no individual
performance benefits. Because of the lack of individual performance benefits, it
is more likely MLB players will decrease effort in the first year of a long-term
contract. In the NFL, players are part of a performance-based pool (PBP). The
pool starts off at $3 million per club in 2006 and increases each subsequent capped
year by 5%. Players are allocated their share of the fund by dividing their PBP
index12 by the sum of the PBP indices for each player on the team and multiplying
that percentage by the club’s total PBP allocation (NFL CBA 2006). As players’
allocation of the PBP depends on their playing time, players are provided with
an incentive not to shirk because they will have more playing time and more
opportunities to make plays if they are performing at full potential. The presence
of the PBP reduces the likelihood that players will shirk after signing a long-term
contract because if performance declines, players’ shares of the PBP drop. In the
NBA, performance incentives are required to be structured so that they provide
incentive for positive achievement by players (NBA CBA 2005). While there are
opportunities for players to get performance-based incentives worked into their
contracts, these incentives may lead players to focus on improving certain skills
that are in the contract, and ignore other skills. While developing the other skills
may help the team as a whole, if there is no monetary incentive attached to them,
12
PBP index = play time percentage/PBP compensation , Play time percentage = player’s total plays on
offense or defense / team’s total plays on offense or defense, PBP compensation = full regular season salary +
prorated signing bonus for current league year + earned incentives + other compensation for current league year
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the opportunity cost of improving those skills over those that are in the contract
rises. However, the existence of performance incentives diminishes the likelihood
that NBA players will show a decline in effort after signing a long-term contract.
Finally, the NHL only allows for performance incentives for certain players (NHL
CBA 2005). As such, there is the potential for players to shirk because there is no
reward for them to make additional effort.
Similarly to how the MLB limits the amount salaries can be reduced,
the NBA CBA mandates that contracts only be extended upward (NBA CBA
2005). Because the length of a contract cannot be reduced during renegotiation,
there may be more incentive for players to shirk early in their contracts because
current contracts cannot be shortened. This increases the likelihood that players
lower effort in the first year of a long-term contract. As players reach the end of a
contract, they can boost performance and still receive a new long-term contract,
based on the idea that teams focus on recent performance more than historical
performance (Healy 2008). In this regard, players’ performance is expected to
increase during the contract year.
Free agency is present in all of the sports included in this study, but
there are differences between leagues. Players are only eligible for free agency
if they have not signed a contract for the next season. The NFL, NBA, and
NHL differentiate between restricted and unrestricted free agents. Unrestricted
free agents are able to sign with any team they choose. Restricted free agents,
however, are eligible to negotiate with any team, but their former team has the
ability to make an offer in order to retain the players. MLB free agency operates
differently, as there is no distinction between free agents. The existence of free
agency increases the likelihood that players will put forth more effort in the
contract year because players will want to be desirable to team owners in hopes of
getting a higher salary.
The presence of guaranteed contracts in sports increases the likelihood
that players will lower effort in the early portion of a long-term contract. If players
sign a long-term contract for five years and the contract is guaranteed, they are
more likely to shirk, as they know that they have a guaranteed salary, regardless
of their performance. MLB, the NBA, and NHL guarantee player contracts, while
the NFL does not make this a league-wide policy (MLB CBA 2007, NFL CBA
2006, NHL CBA 2005, NBA CBA 2005). Because of this, it is less likely that NFL
players will lower effort after signing a long-term contract. There are however,
some contracts in the NFL that are guaranteed. Depending on how many contracts
are guaranteed, the impact of the presence of guaranteed contracts in the NFL
compared with other sports may be ambiguous.
3. Literature Review
There is contradictory evidence regarding how player performance
changes as a result of contract length and where players are in their contracts.
Maxcy examines how long-term contracts influence performance in MLB. If
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effort changes with contract status, performance is assumed to be highest during
the last year of a contract. The author uses first differences to examine the change
in performance as contract status changed. As expected, the author finds that age
and experience are significant factors in performance variation. However, he finds
no evidence that long-term contracts influence performance on average (Maxcy
1997). Maxcy concludes that players and firms have similar goals, and therefore
shirking does not occur.
Another study completed by Maxcy, Fort, and Krautmann examines
ex ante strategic behavior and ex post shirking in terms of the principal-agent
problem. Ex ante strategic behavior is defined as increasing performance just
before contract negotiations. Ex post shirking is defined as reducing effort after a
contract is signed. The authors believe that in order to properly test for shirking, a
comparison between players who are expected to behave strategically and players
who are not at a point in their contracts where they would behave this way is
needed. The way in which performance of a player is affected by proximity to
contract negotiations is tested in this model to examine strategic behavior. To
control for players’ expected performance, the authors use average performance
over the three prior years. Skill is measured by SA for hitters and strikeout-towalk ratio for pitchers. Playing time and time spent on the disabled list are also
variables included in the model. The authors find that time spent on the disabled
list declines in the period immediately preceding contract negotiations. Playing
time in this period is also higher. The authors find no evidence, however, that
performance declines after a long-term contract is signed (Maxcy et al. 2002).
This study indicates that players may avoid the disabled list more as contract
renegotiations approach because they want to appear strong in hopes of getting a
longer contract; however, long-term contracts do not promote shirking.
Krautmann uses a model of stochastic productivity to test if long-term
contracts diminish work effort in MLB. Rather than simply seeing a drop in
performance as a sign of shirking, Krautmann believes that the model should
test whether a drop in performance lies outside a forecast interval. Performance
varies over a players’ careers, so a drop in performance does not necessarily
signal shirking. Performance is partially dependent on chance, and therefore
low productivity could be due to the stochastic nature of productivity in sports.
However, if performance lies significantly above or below players’ forecast
intervals, which takes performance variations into consideration, players may be
behaving strategically. The author concludes that there is no evidence of shirking,
and that decreased performance is due to the stochastic nature of productivity
rather than asymmetric information (Krautmann 1990).
Sommers studies the influence of salary arbitration on player performance
using MLB. Evidence suggests that lower performance after arbitration may be
due more to aging than shirking (Sommers 1993). Therefore, this could suggest
that arbitration may be an effective mechanism in MLB collective bargaining.
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In contrast to the previous studies mentioned, Woolway finds statistically
significant evidence that multi-year contracts have worker disincentives. Using a
Cobb-Douglas production function, the author examines the marginal products
of players who signed multi-year contracts to test for performance disincentives
associated with long-term contracts. From the production function, Woolway
derives players’ marginal products. A one-tailed significance test is then run to
test the null hypothesis that shirking does not exist. Woolway finds that the null
hypothesis can be rejected. While individual reductions in productivity obtained
by Woolway are not large, if several players have long-term contracts and shirk,
the individual reductions are aggregated and team productivity can significantly
be affected (Woolway 1997).
A study conducted by Stiroh on pay and performance in the NBA finds
that performance improves significantly in the year before a multi-year contract
is signed, and declines after the contract is signed. Stiroh excludes players with
one-year contracts from his analysis to avoid competing incentive effects because
players with one-year contracts are typically marginal players or players near the
end of the career. Using weighted-least squares, the study finds that players with
better performance receive longer contracts with higher salaries. When examining
individual performance and contract status, Stiroh finds that there is improvement
in the contract year, however there is no evidence of a post-contract decline in
performance. Age is negatively related to performance, implying that skills erode
as players get older (Stiroh 2007).
Asch conducts a study of the impact of contract incentives on worker
productivity using Navy recruiters. Recruiters are rewarded for good performance
as a part of an incentive program and also face quotas each month. Higher-quality
recruits provide more points to recruiters, and points are accumulated over
a 12-month period. Asch finds that recruiters vary effort in an attempt to win
rewards. Output is greatest when recruiters are getting close to being eligible to
winning a prize. Also, once recruiters are in a good position to win a reward, they
seem to reduce effort (Asch 1990). This is similar to the idea that players put
forth more effort as they are getting close to contract negotiation, in an attempt to
receive a “prize” of a longer contract and higher pay. Once they have obtained the
contract, however, they relax and reduce effort.
A study similar to Asch’s conducted by Oyer examines the effect of
nonlinear contracts on employee performance. Nonlinear contracts refer to the
nonlinear relationship between compensation and sales or compensation and
profits. In an attempt to reach the annual quota, salespeople may alter effort level
or manipulate the timing of sales. Oyer finds that the nonlinear contracts may
provide incentives for sales employees to bunch sales at the end of the fiscal
year and vary effort throughout the year. There is more incentive for salespeople
to work harder at the end of the fiscal year than during any other time. As the
incentive payment gets closer, employees are willing to exert more effort (Oyer
1998). Put into the context of sports, as players get closer to the possibility of
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higher pay in a new contract, they may be more willing to put forth more effort to
improve performance.
Healy conducts a study on whether firms place too much importance on
most recent performance rather than focusing on past performance. He analyzes
this using MLB. To estimate his equations, a Prais-Winsten regression is used
because there is significant first-order serial correlation in the salary data. The
data shows that teams do not generally use players’ past performance to determine
salary offers. More successful teams, as measured by achieving more wins
than predicted by their payrolls, base salary offers on historical performance.
Unsuccessful teams, however, tend to focus too much on most recent performance
alone (Healy 2008).
4. Data

The data used in this paper include historical performance statistics from
players in MLB, the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA from the years 1992 until
2008. The data include 2,656 player/year observations, with 149 players from
baseball, 103 players from football, 48 players from hockey, and 74 players from
basketball. Summary statistics, divided by sport, are available upon request. The
data on baseball players include pitchers, shortstops (SS), third basemen (3B), and
right fielders (RF). Wide receivers (WR), running backs (RB), and quarterbacks
(QB) are used in the NFL sample. Data for hockey players include only goalies.
Basketball player data include centers, forwards, guards, center-forwards (CF),
and guard-forwards (GF). Players are randomly selected from a list of the current
players holding the previously mentioned positions. Some players are excluded
from the study because historical contract data could not be found.
Because players are randomly selected from players currently in the
leagues, the sample suffers from truncation bias. The study uses point in time
contract information and follows players’ careers backwards. Therefore, the
database does not include players who left the league prior to 2008, excluding
players who only lasted in the league for a couple years. This may affect the
study’s results because these players may behave differently from those who are
able to have long-term careers. Marginal players are less likely to increase effort
in the final year of a contract if they are not expecting to receive a long-term
contract the following year. Therefore, performance in the last year of a contract
would be lower, thus making the coefficient of the variable measuring effort in
the final year of a contract smaller if these players with subpar performance were
included. To avoid this selection bias, future studies could pick a year as a basepoint and follow players’ careers forward, thus encompassing players who only
play for a couple years as well as those with long-term careers.
There are many statistics used to measure player performance, but they
vary in relevance by position. For MLB pitchers, earned run average (ERA), as
used by Maxcy, is used as the performance measure. ERA measures the average
number of runs a pitcher would have given up if he were to pitch a full nine
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innings. Performance of shortstops, third basemen, and right fielders is measured
by slugging average (SA), as used by Maxcy. SA, used to measure batting power,
is calculated by dividing a player’s total number of bases reached on hits divided
by the number of times at bat. For NFL wide receivers, yards per reception (YPR)
is used. YPR is calculated by dividing the number of receiving yards by the number
of receptions. Leeds and Kowalewski use receptions in their study, however yards
per reception is deemed to be a better measure, as it measures whether players
are able do something with the ball once a reception is made. Similarly, based
on the performance measures used by Leeds and Kowalewski, running backs’
performance is measured by receiving yards per reception (YPRRB). This is
calculated in the same manner as YPR. Quarterback performance is measured by
yards per attempt (YPA), as used by Einolf. YPA is calculated by dividing passing
yards by passing attempts. For NBA players, free throw percentage (FTP), as used
by Bodvarsson and Brastow, measures player performance. FTP calculates the
number of free throws made out of the number of free throws attempted. Finally,
for NHL players, save percentage (saveper), as used by Richardson, is used to
measure performance. This statistic measures the percentage of goals a goalie
saves.
For sports that span across two years, namely the NFL and NBA, year
is classified by the year in which the season started. For each player used in the
study, performance, contract information, team, position, and age for every year
the player has been in the league is included. Age is normalized, by subtracting
the mean age for that sport from the player’s age. This is done to control for age
related variation between sports and in contracts due to seniority. For example,
once players in the NFL reach thirty they are seen as old, whereas in the MLB,
thirty year olds are likely to still be able to play for another ten years.
As each sport has different rules and measures of performance, directly
comparing performance statistics across sports is not possible. For example, one
cannot look at ERA and YPR and determine which is the better player. However,
by assigning z-scores to each performance statistic, comparisons between sports
can be made, as the performance statistics are translated into relative performance
in comparison to one’s peers. The frequencies of performance statistics for
each sport are plotted to determine whether they are normally distributed. The
distributions can be seen in Figures 1-7 below. These graphs indicate that the
performance statistics chosen are approximately normally distributed. For MLB
pitchers, a lower
ERA is better than a higher one. A better ERA would have a negative z-score, while
in other sports, better performance measures have positive z-scores; therefore, the
signs of the z-scores for pitchers are reversed.
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Figure 1: ERA Normal Distribution

Figure 2: SA Normal Distribution

n = 492				

n = 93

Figure 3: YPR Normal Distribution

Figure 4: YPA Distribution

		

n = 100					
Figure 5: YPRRB Normal Distribution

n = 103

Figure 6: Saveper Normal Distribution

n = 308					
Figure 7: FTP Normal Distribution

n = 593
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n = 85

5. Methodology
The hypothesis of this study is that the principal-agent problem is a large
enough effect to overcome competing effects, such as the utility players receive
from winning, the endorsement effect, and fame. While effort cannot be easily
measured, performance is assumed to depend on the amount of effort athletes put
forth. Assuming that players change effort based on contract status, the following
regression is estimated:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAGEi,t + βAGE2AGE2i,t + αs + αt + εi,t ,
where Pi,t is the performance measure, PREi,t is equal to 1 in the final year of a
contract and 0 otherwise, POSTi,t is equal to 1 in the year after the contract year
and 0 otherwise, and AGE is a player’s normalized age13. Controls for sport (αs)
and year (αt) are also used. PRE and POST are thought to matter differently from
one sport to another. As such, the sport variables are interacted with the PRE and
POST variables and the following regression is estimated:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAGEi,t + βAGE2AGE2i,t + αs + αt +
PREi,t*αs + POSTi,t*αs + εi,t .
Whereas plain dummy variables shift the intercept of a regression line for various
groups, the interacted dummy variables shift the slope of a regression line (Greene
1993).
A fixed effects model is used because it controls for the average
differences across year and sport in any observable or unobservable predictors.
When using ordinary least squares (OLS), the error terms are assumed to be
normally distributed with constant variance. However, this is not typically true
for panel data. In addition, OLS does not account for unobservable factors that
may be correlated with the variables included in the regression. By using fixed
effects, omitted variable bias is eliminated. When using a fixed effects model,
the differences between units are viewed as parametric shifts of the regression
function (Greene 1993).
The variables of most interest are PRE and POST, as they measure the
impact of contract status on players’ performance. It is expected that βPRE will be
greater than 0, as players increase effort in the contract year, and βPOST will be less
than zero, as players shirk once they obtain a long-term contract. AGE and AGE2
control for the possibility that performance declines as players mature and act as a
proxy for athletic ability, as this changes with over players’ lifetimes.
Regressions for individual sports are also estimated. While performance
measures vary from sport to sport, the basic regression estimated is:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAGEi,t + βAGE2AGE2i,t + αt + αp + εI,t,
where αp is a variable controlling for position. For each sport, several measures
of performance are estimated. Including all players in the sample, regressions are
13

To normalize age, the mean age for the sport was subtracted from a player’s age.
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estimated using players’ performance z-score as well as absolute performance
statistics. As with the regression including all sports, these regressions are
estimated using fixed effects.
6. Results and Discussion
The results of the regression analysis are mixed. These results are
presented in Table 2. Analysis is primarily focused on PRE, POST, AGE, and
AGE2, however year is controlled for in all of the regressions. In the regressions
including all sports, the only years that are statistically significant are 2007 an
2008. In the regressions of the individual sports, none of the year variables are
significant.
When interaction terms are not included in the regression of all sports,
PRE and POST are both negative and significant, indicating that players decrease
effort in both the final year of a contract as well as in the first year of a long-term
contract. While the result of POST is expected, the finding that PRE is negative is
contrary to predictions. Theoretical findings do not provide an explanation of why
players would decrease effort in the final year of a contract. As the sport variables
are also significant, indicating that MLB, the NFL, and the NHL are statistically
significantly different from the NBA, PRE and POST are interacted with the sport
variables. This is intended to capture differences of PRE and POST in the varying
sports.
The only interaction term that is significant is mlbpre, which is negative.
The negative sign indicates that baseball players do not perform as well in the
final year of a contract compared to the NBA. This implies that baseball players
may not be able to change effort to improve performance as much as athletes in
the NBA can during the final year of a contract. After including the interaction
terms, POST remains significantly negative, while PRE becomes positive and
insignificant. While it is not significant, having a positive PRE is in agreement
with the hypothesis. As including the interaction terms changes the sign of PRE,
it appears as though some sports have more incentive to increase effort in the final
year of a contract than others and t the moral hazard problem is worse in some
sport than others.
In all of the leagues, there is incentive for players to shirk early in their
contracts and increase effort in the final year of a contract. Teams tend to focus
mostly on most recent performance, rather than historical performance (Healy
2008). As such, if players sign ten-year contracts and do poorly in the first year,
but do well in the final year, they are still in good position to receive a long-term
contract when they are up for renegotiation. The results of regression analysis
are mixed in this hypothesis. While POST is negative in the instances where it is
significant, indicating that players do take advantage of their ability to shirk, there
is no evidence that players increase effort in the final year of a contract.
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+/- indicates sign
shaded boxes are significant
•
•

Table 2: Summary of Regression Results

Players are expected to reduce effort during the first year of a long-term
contract with the existence of minimum salary because if players shirk, they are
still guaranteed the league-wide minimum salary. POST is negative in most of
the regressions, indicating that performance does decline in the first year of a
long-term contract. POST is significantly positive in the regression using ERA as
the dependent variable, however as a lower ERA is better than a higher one, the
signs for this regression need to be reversed to account for this. Therefore, the
regression indicates that MLB pitchers reduce effort following the signing of a
long-term contract.
In MLB, players’ salary can only be reduced by a limited amount,
providing players with the incentive to shirk. It appears that MLB players are
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more likely to decrease effort in the first year of a long-term contract than NHL
and NBA players. POST is not significant for the NHL or NBA, indicating that
it is not significant in explaining changes in performance level. This supports
the hypothesis that MLB players are more likely to shirk than NHL and NBA
players.
In MLB and the NFL, there is no salary maximum, which is expected
to increase the likelihood that players will increase effort in the final year of a
contract. In the NHL and NBA, players face salary maximums so once a player
reaches the maximum salary, there is little incentive to continue putting forth
more effort, as there is no reward of a higher salary if performance improves.
Regression analysis, however, does not seem to support this prediction. In the
cases where PRE is significant, the regressions suggest that players decrease
effort in the final year of a contract. This does not agree with theory, as reducing
effort and therefore lowering performance is not beneficial for players trying to
obtain as big a contract as possible.
As MLB does not offer performance incentives for players during the
regular season, it is predicted that MLB players are more likely to reduce effort
after signing a long-term contract because post-season incentives are dependent
on how the team as a whole performs and not individual performance. Regression
analysis suggests that MLB players do in fact reduce effort after signing a longterm contract. In all three MLB regressions, POST is significant, indicating
that performance declines in the first year following the signing of a long-term
contract.
The performance incentives offered by the NFL and NBA are expected to
reduce the likelihood of POST being negative and significant. Regression analysis
shows mixed results. In the NFL regressions, POST is negative and significant in
the regressions using z-score and YPR as the dependent variable. However, the
regressions using YPA and YPRRB are insignificant. This suggests that certain
positions in the NFL may lend themselves to shirking more than others, or the
PBP may provide different incentives for different positions. The NBA regressions
indicate that POST is negative, however this is not significant. Players may be apt
to reduce effort in the first year of a long-term contract, but the desire to shirk
appears to be overcome by other factors since POST is not significant.
The NBA CBA mandates that players’ contracts can only be renegotiated
upward. This provides incentive for players to shirk early in their contracts because
they know their current contracts will not be reduced. While it is expected that
POST will be negative and significant, regression analysis shows that POST is
negative and insignificant. While players may indeed reduce effort after signing
a long-term contract, it does not appear to be significant, suggesting that other
factors may outweigh the incentive to shirk.
Free agency is expected in increase the likelihood that players will
increase effort in the final year of a contract. Players want to obtain the most
lucrative contract they can, and therefore want to appear to be valuable members
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of a team. As such, they will not want to reduce effort in the final year of a contract
because team owners prefer top performers to mediocre players. Regression
analysis does not support this prediction, however, as PRE tends to be negative.
The presence of guaranteed contracts is expected to increase the
likelihood that players will lower effort in the first year of a long-term contract.
A guaranteed contract ensures that players will receive their salary, regardless
of whether they have poor performance. The only CBA in this study that does
not provide guaranteed contracts is that of the NFL. As such, the likelihood of
POST being negative and significant is expected to be lower compared to other
leagues. Regression analysis does not support this hypothesis, however, as there
are instances where POST is negative and significant in the NFL, while it is not
in the NHL or NBA. As some NFL players are given guaranteed contracts while
others are not, this result does not hold strong significance. Information regarding
whether a contract is guaranteed is not generally made public, so the number of
players in the NFL sample with guaranteed contracts is unknown. If this data were
available, it would be possible to examine whether NFL players with guaranteed
contracts behave differently from those without.
While the signs of AGE and AGE2 vary between the regressions, there
appears to be a common trend. Where AGE and AGE2 are significant, AGE is
positive and AGE2 is negative. AGE captures the experience players gain as
they get older, which will tend to improve performance, and AGE2 captures the
deteriorating effects of age on performance. As players age, even if they are putting
forth the same amount of effort, their performance will eventually start to decline.
Skills begin to deteriorate with age, which leads to lower performance levels.
Looking at the individual sport regressions, it is apparent that both
significance and sign change as the equations are estimated using the z-score
version of performance statistics and various performance statistics, depending on
sport and position. This indicates that certain positions or performance measures
may be more sensitive to changing effort than others.
The models analyzed in this study use both z-scores, which measure
relative performance, as the dependent variable and raw performance statistics,
which measure absolute performance. Relative performance examines the change
in performance over a contract in comparison with other players in the league.
Therefore, if other players are performing poorly, a decrease in effort resulting in a
decline in performance may not be seen as readily. However, absolute performance
solely examines a player’s performance relative to his past performance.
A common pattern across all the regressions is that POST is mostly
negative, especially when it is significant. While there are some deviations from
this, the results generally imply that players reduce effort after signing a long-term
contract. While none of the coefficients are particularly large, this result is still
significant. One player reducing effort after signing a long-term contract may not
have a sizeable impact on team performance overall, however if many players are
lowering effort, team performance as a whole may begin to fall.
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An issue that the model may be facing is a small sample size. When
all the sports are included, the model has a fairly large sample size, however
when broken up by sport and position, the number of observations is significantly
decreased. Also, using only one position for hockey may not allow the model to
capture all the effects of a change in contract status.
A potential reason for the lack of consistency in the sign and significance
of PRE is that the variable may not be measured correctly. In this study, players are
assumed to increase performance in the final year of a contract. However, players
may operate in a different time frame and may increase performance before this
point in hopes of securing a long-term contract.
As the models in this study are slightly different from Stiroh’s model,
Stiroh’s model is replicated as closely as possible to determine if his results are
repeatable. The model used is:
Pi,t = βPREPREi,t + βPOSTPOSTi,t + βAGEAgei,t + αa + αp + αl + αt + εi,t ,
where αa controls for player and αl is controls for team. Weighted least squares
is used to estimate the regression, using the percentage of games played for
the season as weights. The results of this regression are shown in Table 3. The
significance of the control variables is mixed; some are significant while others
are not. While Stiroh finds PRE to be positive and significant, POST to be positive
and insignificant, and age to be negative and significant, this study finds PRE to
be positive and insignificant, POST to be negative and insignificant, and Age to
be positive and significant.
Table 3: Replication of Stiroh’s Study (FTP is dependent variable, t-stats in
parentheses)

PRE

FTP
0.0079
(1.04)

POST

-0.0033
(-0.45)

Age

0.0055
(2.12)

R-squared

0.7590
(9.58)

Observations 486
Whereas Stiroh concludes that there is improvement in performance in the contract
year, this study cannot do so. A smaller sample size may be part of the reason for
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variations in the results, as Stiroh has a sample size of 2,646 while this study only
has 486 observations. In addition, the weights used in the study may differ from
Stiroh’s weights, as he does not clearly define how he calculates his weights.
7. Conclusion
The mixed results that are obtained in this study align with the
contradictory evidence regarding player performance over the course of a contract
seen in past studies. Various reasons for the contradictory evidence exist. Certain
positions or performance measures may allow players to alter effort more than
others. Therefore, using different performance statistics from the ones used in
this study may change the significance of PRE and POST. In addition, players
may reduce effort in the off-season rather than during games, which may not be
reflected directly in the performance statistics chosen. If, for example, a basketball
player does not practice his free throw during the off-season, his FTP may not be
affected significantly in the subsequent season, as it is a skill that he has perfected
over time and may be able pick up again without much practice. Increasing the
sample size may also improve significance.
This study’s key finding is that players’ performance levels decline
during the first year after signing a long-term contract, suggesting that the effects
of the principal-agent problem may outweigh competing effects. This is of
importance because if managers expect that players will shirk after singing longterm contracts, they can implement incentive mechanisms in the contracts in order
to prevent shirking. The study also has conclusive evidence that as players gain
experience, performance increases, however as players age, skills begin to erode
and performance eventually declines.
The finding that players reduce effort after signing a long-term contract
should be of interest to other types of firms as well. In sports, it is relatively
easy to measure individual performance through performance statistics. However,
in other professions, such as teaching, it is much harder to measure individual
performance. Employers are not able to monitor effort as effectively, and therefore
face a moral hazard problem. Employees are paid to do a certain job, but since
employers are not always able to monitor effort, they are often able to shirk. While
this may not be able to be measured empirically, this study suggests that this is
what occurs.
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